War in Ukraine: What Assessment Can Be Made After Two Years of Conflict?

Two years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the conflict in eastern Ukraine is becoming bogged down and Russian offensives on several fronts continue to intensify. What assessment can be made after two years of conflict? What is the outlook for Ukrainian defence and Russian military objectives? Interview with Jean de Gliniasty, former French ambassador to Russia, research director at IRIS and specialist in Russian issues.

What military assessment can be made after two years of conflict? What is the Russian strategy now?

For the Russians, the war has gone through several phases. After the initial failure of the attempt to dominate the country by taking the capital (March 2022), Russia not without difficulty conquered another part of the Donbass and above all the Black Sea coast (siege of Marioupol) as far as Kherson on the right bank of the Dnieper, establishing territorial continuity between Crimea and the Donbass (spring 2022). Then, the victorious counter-offensive by Ukrainian forces between August and September 2022 in Kherson and the Kharkiv region forced the Russians to withdraw from many occupied towns during 2022, losing some of the territorial gains of the initial offensive and retaining only part of the oblasts (districts) of the Donbass. The Russians then consolidated their defensive positions in anticipation of the Ukrainian offensive expected in the summer of 2023. This failed and the Ukrainians « burnt » a large amount of modern equipment supplied by the West. Since the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, the Russians have stepped up the pressure along the entire front line as their hard-tested equipment has been renewed (the equivalent of two new heavy tank regiments a month). After the reduction of the Avdiivka salient in February, Russian pressure was increasing everywhere (Kupiansk, Kramatorsk region, etc.). The Russians intend to extend their advantage by taking advantage of their current superiority in terms of men, munitions and equipment, and hope to break through the Ukrainian defensive lines before the new commitments made by the West (at least 60 F16 fighter bombers, artillery and 155 MM shells) materialise (end 2024). But the Ukrainians are resisting. Vladimir Putin has reaffirmed his war aims, which are not very clear (denazification, neutralisation, etc.), leaving him room for manoeuvre in terms of war or negotiation. In the event of a Russian breakthrough, it seems that the Black Sea coast would be targeted as a priority to step up the blockade of Ukraine and secure the Russian fleet, which has suffered heavy losses from drones and Ukrainian coastal missile batteries. In the absence of a Russian breakthrough, the conflict will drag on for a long time, which is what the belligerents are preparing for (war economy in Russia, draft law on mobilisation in Ukraine and production of military equipment on site, etc.). The fate of the war hangs in the balance with the risk of a Russian breakthrough.

What is the outlook for Ukrainian defence and its supporters, and what is the likelihood of an eventual resolution to the conflict?

For Ukraine, it’s a question of holding out until European support arrives (50 billion euros in civilian support until 2027, 155MM shells, F16 aircraft), and even American support if the 60 billion dollar package is released by Congress. 2024 will be a difficult year for Kiev, where the new law on mobilisation is struggling to be passed, morale is falling and recent changes in the General Staff (replacement of Valeri Zaloujny by Oleksandr Syrsky) are destabilising the war effort. But Ukraine is resisting the Russian push and is supplying its weapons for the end of the year. Against this backdrop, there was no time for negotiation. Ukraine has not given up hope of regaining its entire territory, bringing Vladimir Putin to justice and obtaining financial compensation for the Russian aggression and destruction. For his part, President Putin, in the midst of his re-election campaign, is highlighting his victories (Avdiivka) and repeating that Russia will pursue its objectives, which are actually formulated in very general terms (« denazification » and neutralisation of Ukraine). Russia undoubtedly wants at least to take back the whole of the four oblasts of Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporija and Kherson, whose annexation it has solemnly announced for September 2022, without occupying the entire territory. What’s more, the Russians are tempted to wait for the American presidential election and a possible election of Donald Trump, who promises to resolve the crisis in 24 hours (by putting pressure on Ukraine, it is implied). In any case, the Russians believe that time is on their side. So this is no time for negotiation.

After two years of conflict, where does Russia stand on the international stage?

While Russia has so far had a mixed record in terms of arms, its diplomatic results have been more positive. Apart from what the Russians call the « collective West » (NATO, the European Union and six Asian countries), no country in the « global South » applies Western sanctions, and the threat of secondary sanctions will not change much, given the advantages for countries that circumvent sanctions. Saudi Arabia is reducing its production to keep up the price of oil so that the Russian war effort can continue. The shift in Russian exports to Asia (now almost three quarters, compared with 20% for Europe), and in particular hydrocarbon exports to India and China (where almost 40% of hydrocarbon imports now come from Russia), has been a successful operation. The growth rate of the Russian economy in 2023 (3.6% compared with virtual stagnation in Europe) is the direct consequence of this long-prepared diplomatic success. But Russia has also benefited from the situation in Gaza, which has aroused widespread indignation in the « global South ». The West’s inaction in the face of the Israeli bombardments and its « double standards » in its moral judgements are condemned there, and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Western countries’ moral condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

 

Translated by Deepl.