Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi: an Unsurprising Victory in an Egypt in Crisis

The Egyptian presidential election that began on 10 December is expected to result in the re-election of outgoing President Abdelfattah Al-Sissi for a third term. What is the economic, political and social context in which this election is taking place and, with the main political opponents having been sidelined, what are the prospects for Egypt after the Egyptian President’s re-election? To what extent has President Abdelfattah Al-Sissi exploited the Palestinian cause in his presidential campaign? At a time when Egypt has become an indispensable interlocutor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, how could Abdelfattah Al-Sissi’s victory strengthen Egypt’s role on the international stage? Didier Billion, Deputy Director of IRIS and a Middle East specialist, takes a closer look at this issue.

What is the economic, political and social context in which this election is taking place and, with the main political opponents having been removed, what are the prospects for Egypt after the re-election of the outgoing Egyptian President Abdelfattah Al-Sissi?

The economic situation is catastrophic in a country of 105 million people, with a demographic growth rate of 2% a year and the prospect of reaching 200 million by the end of the century. These difficulties are compounded by the fact that only 8% of the national territory is habitable, and by the effects of global warming, which are particularly acute in the region.

Today, according to official figures, 30% of the population is below the poverty line, the middle classes are becoming poorer, inflation has reached 40% year-on-year in September 2023 and 70% for food products. Finally, it is an economy in which the army continues to play an essential role and which suffers from structural under-investment in productive areas.

Of course, the war in Gaza has had a negative impact, particularly on tourism. But it is above all the consequences of the war in Ukraine that have affected the country, particularly in terms of purchases of hydrocarbons and food products. These phenomena automatically feed the debt, which now stands at around 150 billion dollars.

For these reasons, Egypt is once again turning to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF has already intervened on several occasions, in 2016 with a $12 million programme, and again in May and June 2020. These appeals to the IMF automatically increase the country’s external debt, and Egypt is now the second most indebted country to the IMF, after Argentina.

More than ever, the IMF is imposing draconian conditions. While Egypt’s needs are estimated at 30 billion dollars to stay afloat, the IMF is only willing to negotiate on 3 billion dollars and is asking the Gulf Arab states, primarily Saudi Arabia, to try to alleviate the situation. The question is whether Egypt is too important to run the risk of simply letting it go under, or whether it is too late and too expensive to save it.

Deposits from the Gulf states account for around 85% of the foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank of Egypt. But, more importantly, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are becoming increasingly demanding, especially since, since 2013, they have given billions of dollars without any real quid pro quo and without any structural economic reforms.

These countries are now buying up the parts of the economy that are working (state-owned companies, critical infrastructure, farmland, etc.), in other words a logic of predation, which constitutes a mortal danger for the Egyptian economy.

Violent reactions could, of course, crystallise both from the army and, of course, from the population. There are also fears of yet another devaluation after the elections, which explains why the latter, initially scheduled for spring 2024, have been brought forward by a few months.

To what extent has President Abdelfattah al-Sissi exploited the Palestinian cause for his presidential campaign, even though he has refused to welcome to Egypt the Gazan refugees who are gathering at the Rafah crossing?

Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi is running for a third consecutive term, and there is no suspense about the outcome. The only important factor is the turnout. For the record, in the previous presidential election in 2018 Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi was re-elected with 97% of the vote, but with only a 41% turnout.

To put it plainly, there was no election campaign, no public meeting, no debate, just a kind of non-event. None of the other three candidates in the race are opponents, and in reality they are providing Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi with a supposedly democratic endorsement. For their part, the few genuine opponents were unable to stand, having failed to gather the necessary 20 parliamentary endorsements and 25,000 signatures.

In the end, it was the conflict in Gaza that focused all the attention, particularly as Egypt is on the front line with its 12km border with the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing point. Egypt sees itself as in a state of war and Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi as a warlord. He has been very active on this point since 7 October, posing as the defender of national sovereignty and integrity in the face of the hypothetical expulsion of Gazans.

Criticised in 2014 during the clashes between Israel and Gaza, when he had kept the border closed, he is currently rather supported because he appears to be a defender of the Palestinian cause and has succeeded in achieving a form of national unity. He has not used humanitarian arguments but has concentrated on the political register. His main argument is not without foundation when he explains that the Israelis want to liquidate the Palestinian question on Egypt’s back. He considers that if the Palestinians left Gaza, they would not be able to return. From this point of view, the 1948-1949 Nakba refugee syndrome comes into play.

It is precisely this argument that has enabled him to achieve a form of national unity despite some criticism of his management of Rafah. It is necessary to understand that in Egypt, as in all the countries in the region, the Palestinian cause remains at the heart of hundreds of thousands of citizens and that it is often a means of political socialisation, a place of politicisation that can worry the regime.

This is why the authorities are trying to harness popular anger and did not hesitate to organise impressive demonstrations on 20 October. However, many anti-regime slogans appeared, with a brief incursion into the highly symbolic Tahrir Square in Cairo. We are therefore witnessing a dual movement: national unity and opposition to the regime when the opportunity arises.

Superimposed on these parameters is the question of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is of particular importance in Egypt since President-Marshal Sissi came to power after organising a coup d’état against the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, even though it had come to power democratically. Hamas, for its part, represents the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the 2013 coup, an obsessive anti-Brotherhood attitude developed in Egyptian decision-making circles, which also focused on Hamas.

It was only at the end of the 2010s that relations with Hamas began to warm up. Not only has this made it possible to better manage the lawless situation that prevails in the Sinai and which therefore requires cooperation with Hamas to better control the « tunnel trade ». But the main reason for this improvement in relations is that Egypt’s international credibility remains partly linked to its ability to take on the role of mediator, and therefore to the need to talk to both parties. For example, Egypt is to be credited with managing to stop the fighting during the umpteenth crisis between Gaza and Israel in 2021. However, it has to be admitted that Egypt has since been largely supplanted by Qatar in this mediation role.

 

Egypt, a mediating power and the gateway for humanitarian aid to Gaza, has become an indispensable interlocutor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the eyes of the international community. How could Abdelfattah Al-Sissi’s victory strengthen Egypt’s role on the international stage?

The first point to emphasise is Egypt’s loss of influence on the regional and international stage. This is due in particular to the problematic economic situation already mentioned, which de facto restricts the country’s capacity for initiative.

Even so, Egypt remains one of the main recipients of US military aid, worth between 1.2 and 1.3 billion dollars a year. Washington’s occasional criticism of the serious restrictions on democratic rights does not prevent it from continuing to regard Egypt as a guarantor of US interests in the region. This does not rule out public disagreements, as Antony Blinken experienced in mid-October, when his request for Cairo to take in hundreds of thousands of Gazans was met with an icy refusal.

These episodic tensions have convinced Egypt’s leaders to diversify their foreign policy agreements. The return of Russia is spectacular and relations have never been so good since the break-up of the former USSR. Trade has also deepened with a number of European Union countries, notably Italy, Germany and above all France. China, while not absent, remains cautious.

As we can see, Egypt continues to try to enjoy a real geopolitical advantage, but one that is tending to fade over the years, and it will probably be very difficult for it to maintain its importance in the process of regional geopolitical recomposition.

 

Translated by Deepl.